KIMBERLY-CLARK CORP (KMB)
NEUTRALFundamental
56
Price
$110.46
Market Cap
$37.04B
Part 1 · What the company is worth
Overview
Kimberly-Clark makes disposable personal-care and tissue products — diapers (Huggies), feminine and adult care, paper towels and toilet paper (Kleenex, Scott) — sold mainly through supermarkets, mass retailers and pharmacies. Its North America business is the larger and more profitable half; a separate International Personal Care unit sells largely the same categories outside the US and Canada. It is also folding in Kenvue (Tylenol, Band-Aid, Listerine) through a pending acquisition, and moving its non-US tissue business into a joint venture with Brazil's Suzano.
How it makes money
Kimberly-Clark sells everyday disposable products that customers repurchase every few weeks, so revenue depends on volume and price/mix rather than one-time big-ticket sales. It negotiates directly with a small number of very large retailers — Walmart alone is about 16% of net sales — who control shelf space and can push back hard on price increases, especially when store-brand alternatives sit right next to Kimberly-Clark's products. Profitability rises and falls largely with the cost of pulp, resin and other raw materials relative to what retailers accept in price increases.
Revenue by segment
Personal care and tissue brands sold in the US and Canada, Kimberly-Clark's largest and most profitable market.
Diapers, feminine and adult care products sold outside North America, largely in emerging markets.
Competitive moat
Brand · NarrowHuggies, Kleenex and Scott are recognized household names that let Kimberly-Clark charge more than unbranded alternatives and secure shelf space with retailers. But private-label products sit right next to them at lower prices in every category it competes in, and large retailers hold real bargaining power over listing and price, so the brand premium is real but limited rather than dominant.
What drives demand
DefensiveDiapers, tissue and paper towels are bought regardless of the economic cycle, since consumers rarely cut back on basic hygiene products even in a downturn, which keeps volumes fairly stable. The bigger swing factor is the input-cost cycle — pulp, resin and energy prices — and retailers' willingness to accept the price increases needed to offset it, not end-consumer demand itself.
Key risks
- Retailer bargaining power — A handful of very large retailers, led by Walmart, control the shelf space Kimberly-Clark depends on and can resist price increases or favor private-label alternatives.
- Raw material cost volatility — Prices for pulp, resin, energy and other key inputs can rise sharply, and Kimberly-Clark may not be able to fully offset them through pricing without hurting volume.
- Kenvue acquisition integration — The pending Kenvue acquisition will substantially increase debt and carries execution risk; the deal could also be delayed, face regulatory obstacles, or fail to deliver the expected synergies.
- Private-label competition — Store-brand competitors, some with significantly lower development and manufacturing costs, offer comparable products at lower prices in nearly every category Kimberly-Clark serves.
Customer concentration
Top customers account for 16% of revenue
Walmart alone accounted for approximately 16% of net sales from continuing operations in 2025, concentrated mostly in the North America segment; losing shelf space or favorable terms with a retailer this size would be difficult to replace elsewhere.
The case for
Buyers argue that Kleenex, Huggies and Scott are habitual purchases that hold their shelf position through economic cycles, that adding Kenvue's health-care brands diversifies the business beyond paper and diaper categories, and that shedding the lower-margin international tissue business into the Suzano joint venture should lift overall margins.
The case against
Sellers worry that the Kenvue deal loads the balance sheet with new debt right as Kimberly-Clark still has to prove the acquisition's synergies, that a handful of retailers led by Walmart can squeeze pricing whenever input costs rise, and that private-label alternatives keep gaining share in categories where the brand premium is hardest to defend.
Written by the editors, published on August 18, 2026
Direct competitors
Who this company fights with for the same customers
No editorial profile for this company yet
No competitor list for this company yet.
Balance Sheet & Liquidity
Revenue
$16.58B
Trailing 12 months (through 6/30/2026)
Net Income
$1.96B
Trailing 12 months (through 6/30/2026)
Free Cash Flow
$1.64B
Total Equity
$1.50B
Total Liabilities
$15.47B
Current Ratio
0.91
Interest Coverage
9.18
Debt/EBITDA
2.06
Earnings Per Share
Revenue & Net Income
Free Cash Flow
Income Breakdown
Historical statement
Margins over time
Debt over time
How heavy the debt is
Growth grid
Growth — Revenue
Fair Value Estimation
Fair Value
$105.17
Current Price
$110.46
Margin of Safety
-5.0%
Fair Value Range
$69.32 - $141.03
Estimation Methods
Valuation Metrics
P/E Ratio
18.94
ROE
134.6%
P/B Ratio
21.17
P/FCF
20.35
Gross Margin
36.8%
ROIC
18.6%
Profitability Radar
Value Creation (Economic Moat)
ROIC
18.6%
WACC
7.3%
ROIC − WACC
+11.4 pp
ROIC exceeds the cost of capital — the company is creating value for shareholders.
Fundamental Analysis Criteria
Passed (15)
- EPS shows upward trend
- ROIC 18.6%
- Gross Margin 36.8%
- P/FCF 20.35
- Operating Margin 14.3%
- Positive Free Cash Flow
- Current Ratio
- Interest Coverage
- Debt/EBITDA
- Return on Tangible Assets
- ROE 122.6%
- Earnings Surprise avg 2.9%
- Earnings Quality (OCF/NI) 1.70
- Share Dilution -1.2%
- Piotroski F-Score 5/9
Failed (11)
- EPS CAGR 2.23%
- Price CAGR -0.43%
- P/B Ratio 21.17
- Debt/Equity ratio
- CapEx intensity
- Low reliance on intangibles
- Price below Graham Number
- DCF valuation (Fairly valued)
- Revenue Growth 5Y -3.0%
- Analyst Consensus 43% Buy
- Net Margin Trend 11.8% vs 14.8%
Unavailable (2)
- Dividend Payout NaN%
- PEG Ratio (need PE > 0 and growth > 0)
Piotroski F-Score
Mixed signals: some areas need attention
Earnings Quality
High quality: earnings backed by cash
Share Dilution
Buying back shares. Shareholder friendly
Governance
Executive Team
| Name | Title | Age |
|---|---|---|
| Mr. Michael D. Hsu | Chairman & CEO | 61 |
| Mr. Russell C. Torres | President & COO | 53 |
| Mr. Nelson Urdaneta | Senior VP, CFO & Interim Principal Accounting Officer, | 53 |
| Mr. Jeffrey P. Melucci J.D. | Chief Strategy, Business Development & Administrative Officer | 54 |
| Mr. Francesco Tinto | Chief Information & Global Business Services Officer | - |
| Mr. Christopher M. Jakubik C.F.A. | Investor Relations Contact | - |
| Mr. Grant B. McGee J.D. | General Counsel | 44 |
| Ms. Preeti Binoy | Head Corporate Communications & Government Affairs - India | - |
| Ms. Stacey J. Valy Panayiotou | Chief Human Resources Officer | 52 |
| Mr. Ehab Abou-Oaf | Chief Executive Officer of Arbex | 58 |
Audit Risk
3
Board Risk
5
Compensation Risk
6
Shareholder Rights Risk
4
Part 2 · The price and when to enter
This part won't tell you whether the company is worth owning: it helps you choose when to buy it, once the fundamentals have convinced you. Inside: technical analysis, potential, historical drawdowns, gamma exposure.
Latest News
Recent headlines for KMB, sourced from Markets Gazette.