SSR Mining Inc. (SSRM)

How it makes money

SSR Mining sells commodities at prices it does not set. Gold doré from Marigold, CC&V and Seabee is refined to bullion and sold mainly to bullion banks in the London spot market, with the price fixed on the day of sale at the applicable gold fix or spot price and payment due on delivery of the bullion credits; doré from Çöpler, when it operates, is sold on the Istanbul Gold Exchange, where the Central Bank of Türkiye has first right of refusal on all gold mined in the country. Puna's silver-lead and zinc concentrates are sold to smelters and traders in Asia and Europe under contracts renewed annually or on the spot market, net of treatment and refining charges, with the price provisional until settlement. In 2025 gold was 71% of product revenue, silver 24%, lead 3% and other items 2%. Revenue therefore moves with two things only: how many ounces are produced and what the metal is worth on the day — the average gold price was $3,435/oz in 2025 against $2,387/oz in 2024, which is most of why revenue rose 63.7%.

Revenue by segment

SSR Mining has no durable competitive advantage of the kind that protects pricing. It sells gold and silver at world prices set by the market, so it cannot charge more than anyone else for the same ounce, and its customers — bullion banks and smelters — face no switching cost at all. The 10-K itself describes the industry as intensely competitive for orebodies, technical staff, labour and capital, and notes that many larger competitors have more financial and technical resources. The only thing resembling a barrier is the ore in the ground and the permits attached to it, and Çöpler shows how fragile that is: after the February 2024 incident the operating permits were revoked and the mine has produced nothing since. Nor is SSR protected by cost position — its results improved in 2025 chiefly because the gold price rose, not because it out-produced anyone.

Demand for the ounces themselves rarely disappears — there is always a buyer for gold at some price — but the price does the swinging, and the price is the whole business. The filing says the market prices of gold and silver are the key drivers of profitability and that they can fluctuate widely, moved by consumption patterns, central-bank buying and selling, monetary and fiscal policy, interest rates, currencies and inflation expectations. Gold has an unusual twist for a commodity: it is bought as a safe haven in market turmoil and as a defence against inflation and currency depreciation, so it can rise exactly when industrial demand is falling. Silver, 24% of 2025 product revenue, behaves more like an industrial metal, as do the lead and zinc by-products. The result is a very volatile top line for reasons outside the company's control: revenue was $1,426.9 million in 2023, fell 30.2% to $995.6 million in 2024 when Çöpler stopped, then rose 63.7% to $1,629.6 million in 2025 as gold averaged $3,435/oz against $2,387/oz the year before. Costs barely move with prices, so profits amplify the swing — an operating loss of $322.3 million in 2024 became operating income of $461.4 million in 2025.

Key risks

• The Çöpler Incident: losses, liabilities and a restart nobody can date — The company discloses that actual and potential losses and liabilities from the February 2024 heap-leach slip could materially hurt its financial condition, liquidity, cash flows and results. Operating permits and the 2021 environmental impact assessment were revoked and remain suspended; investigations and remediation continue; the company states it cannot predict if, when or on what conditions it will be allowed to restart, and that a restart under the older 2014 assessment would limit the sulfide plant to 6,000 tonnes per day instead of 9,000. Management attention and cash may be diverted from the other mines to fund remediation or pay claims.
• Metal prices fluctuate widely and the company cannot influence them — The 10-K lists among the drivers of gold and silver prices: consumption patterns, supply and demand, central-bank gold sales, purchases or leasing, monetary and fiscal policy, recession or reduced economic activity, speculative short positions, forward sales by producers, the cost of metal substitutes, weaker industrial, jewellery or investment demand, import and export taxes and tariffs, inflation expectations, interest rates and currency values. None of these is under the company's control, and all of them feed straight into revenue.
• Reserve estimates may not hold, and reserves may not be replaced — Estimates of mineral reserves and resources rest on interpretation and assumptions and may yield less metal in practice than currently estimated. Separately, the company warns it may be unable to replace the reserves it mines or to acquire additional commercially mineable mineral rights — a mine is a depleting asset, and the filing notes that the copper reserves and resources previously reported at Çöpler were removed entirely once the heap leach was set for decommissioning.
• Political and regulatory risk in the countries where the mines are — The company mines under concessions granted by, or contracts with, the governments of the United States, Canada, Argentina and Türkiye, and states these are subject to the political risks of the host country. It discloses risks from political or economic instability and unexpected regulatory change, from civil disobedience, from the obligation to provide benefits to host communities and countries, from Indigenous peoples' title claims and rights to consultation and accommodation, and from tax assessments in multiple jurisdictions.
• Closure and remediation obligations may exceed the amounts set aside — Land reclamation, mine closure and remediation requirements and costs may be burdensome, and actual environmental and asset-retirement obligations may exceed the company's estimates and reserves. The group booked $88.9 million of reclamation and remediation costs and $151.8 million of care-and-maintenance expense in 2025, most of it at the idle Çöpler site.
• Rising costs, supply chain and energy — Increased operating and capital costs could affect profitability. Operations depend on continuous supplies of diesel, tyres, sodium cyanide, reagents, energy, water, equipment and labour, whose costs are set by world supply and demand; the company flags supply-chain disruptions, power outages, labour disputes and shifting trade and tariff policies as things that could raise costs, and notes the specific fragility of the seasonal ice road that serves Seabee.
• Counterparty risk on the sale of doré and concentrates — The company states there is no assurance it will succeed in entering into arrangements to sell its doré or concentrates on acceptable terms, or at all, and that it may be forced to sell in the spot market or find no market for its products. It is also exposed if a counterparty fails to honour an arrangement or becomes insolvent, or if its doré or concentrates fail to meet the qualitative or quantitative requirements of buyers.

Top customers account for 69% of revenue

Very concentrated on paper, much less so in substance. The 10-K's table of customers accounting for 10% or more of gross revenue lists, for 2025, Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce at 33%, Royal Bank of Canada at 13%, National Bank of Canada at 12% and Trafigura Trading LLC at 11% — four names that together add up to 69% of gross revenue. The first three are bullion banks buying refined gold from Marigold, CC&V and Seabee; Trafigura buys Puna's concentrate. Because gold is sold at the daily fix or spot price on a liquid world market, losing one of these buyers means finding another counterparty, not losing a customer relationship or a price. Puna's concentrate sales are the more genuinely relationship-bound side, sold under annually renewed contracts to smelters and traders in Asia and Europe. The names also change fast: in 2024 the disclosed customers were CIBC at 30% and Asahi Refinery at 13%, and in 2023 CIBC at 33% and the Central Bank of Türkiye at 31%.