Wyndham Hotels & Resorts, Inc. (WH)
NEUTRALFundamental
60
Price
$75.86
Market Cap
$5.57B
Part 1 · What the company is worth
Overview
Wyndham franchises hotels rather than owning them: it licenses brands such as Days Inn, Super 8, Ramada and Wyndham to independent and small-chain hotel owners around the world, who pay to use the name, the central reservation system and the Wyndham Rewards loyalty program. It operates through more than 6,200 franchisees and is concentrated in economy and midscale hotels rather than luxury. It owns almost none of the real estate its brands appear on.
How it makes money
Franchisees pay Wyndham a royalty of roughly 5% of their room revenue for the right to use its brand, plus a separate marketing and reservation fee of 2-4% of room revenue that funds the shared booking system and Wyndham Rewards program rather than flowing through as profit. A smaller stream is a licensing fee from Travel + Leisure, its former parent, under an agreement dating to its 2018 spin-off — revenue tied to a legacy contract rather than to hotels Wyndham operates today.
Revenue by segment
Core brand-licensing income, roughly 5% of a franchised hotel's room revenue, the most direct measure of Wyndham's franchise business.
Fees that fund the shared reservation system and marketing; largely pass-through spending rather than pure profit for Wyndham.
Ancillary revenue from other services Wyndham provides to franchisees and hotel owners beyond core royalties.
A contractual licensing fee paid by Travel + Leisure, the vacation-ownership business Wyndham spun off in 2018, unrelated to hotel operations.
Fees tied to running the Wyndham Rewards loyalty program, funded by participating hotels and partners.
Competitive moat
Switching costs · NarrowFranchise agreements typically run 10 to 20 years, and switching a hotel's brand mid-agreement means new signage, systems and lost access to Wyndham's reservation pipeline and loyalty members — a real cost for the franchisee. That keeps existing hotels in the system, but it does not stop Wyndham from having to win every new franchise deal against Choice, Best Western and other economy-brand rivals.
What drives demand
CyclicalFranchise and marketing fees are calculated as a percentage of franchisees' room revenue, so they rise and fall with hotel occupancy and room rates, which the company itself ties to economic conditions such as inflation, interest rates, employment and discretionary income — travel spending is one of the first things households and businesses cut in a downturn.
Key risks
- Franchisee performance drives fee revenue — Royalties and marketing fees are a percentage of franchisees' room revenue, so a weak year for individual hotel owners — due to location, competition or local conditions — reduces Wyndham's own revenue.
- Economic and travel-demand downturns — The company names recessionary pressures, inflation and reduced discretionary income among the economic factors that can cut hotel demand and therefore franchise fees.
- Brand and reputation risk — Franchisees' and guests' perception of a brand affects every hotel flying that flag; cyber incidents or reputational damage at the corporate level can hit revenue system-wide.
- Dependence on a legacy licensing agreement — A meaningful slice of revenue is a fee from Travel + Leisure under a contract tied to Wyndham's 2018 spin-off, a revenue source outside its own hotel-franchising operations.
The case for
Buyers argue that Wyndham's economy and midscale focus is more resilient than luxury hotels in a downturn since travelers trade down rather than stop traveling, that long franchise agreements and a loyalty program give it recurring, high-margin fee income with almost no real-estate risk, and that the model scales without Wyndham having to fund new hotel construction itself.
The case against
Sellers worry that franchise and marketing fees are ultimately a percentage of what individual hotel owners earn, so a broad travel slowdown hits Wyndham indirectly but still meaningfully, that competition among economy-brand franchisors for the same hotel owners limits pricing power, and that a slice of revenue depends on a legacy contract with its former parent rather than the core franchising business.
Written by the editors, published on August 18, 2026
Direct competitors
Who this company fights with for the same customers
No editorial profile for this company yet
No competitor list for this company yet.
Balance Sheet & Liquidity
Revenue
$1.42B
Trailing 12 months (through 6/30/2026)
Net Income
$208M
Trailing 12 months (through 6/30/2026)
Free Cash Flow
$321M
Total Equity
$468M
Total Liabilities
$3.71B
Current Ratio
0.99
Interest Coverage
3.01
Debt/EBITDA
5.77
Earnings Per Share
Revenue & Net Income
Free Cash Flow
Income Breakdown
Historical statement
Margins over time
Debt over time
How heavy the debt is
Growth grid
Growth — Revenue
Fair Value Estimation
Fair Value
$82.67
Current Price
$75.86
Margin of Safety
+8.2%
Fair Value Range
$53.73 - $111.60
Estimation Methods
Valuation Metrics
P/E Ratio
27.04
ROE
41.2%
P/B Ratio
11.49
P/FCF
17.08
Gross Margin
-
ROIC
8.8%
Profitability Radar
Value Creation (Economic Moat)
ROIC
8.8%
WACC
7.0%
ROIC − WACC
+1.9 pp
ROIC exceeds the cost of capital — the company is creating value for shareholders.
Fundamental Analysis Criteria
Passed (17)
- EPS shows upward trend
- Price CAGR 6.42%
- ROIC 8.8%
- P/FCF 17.08
- Operating Margin 30.2%
- Positive Free Cash Flow
- CapEx intensity
- Current Ratio
- Interest Coverage
- Debt/EBITDA
- Return on Tangible Assets
- ROE 42.1%
- Analyst Consensus 84% Buy
- Earnings Surprise avg 2.5%
- Earnings Quality (OCF/NI) 1.78
- Share Dilution -3.6%
- Piotroski F-Score 5/9
Failed (8)
- EPS CAGR 3.98%
- P/B Ratio 11.49
- Debt/Equity ratio
- Low reliance on intangibles
- Price below Graham Number
- DCF valuation (Overvalued)
- Revenue Growth 5Y 1.9%
- Net Margin Trend 14.7% vs 23.2%
Unavailable (3)
- Gross Margin NaN%
- Dividend Payout NaN%
- PEG Ratio (need PE > 0 and growth > 0)
Piotroski F-Score
Mixed signals: some areas need attention
Earnings Quality
High quality: earnings backed by cash
Share Dilution
Buying back shares. Shareholder friendly
Governance
Executive Team
| Name | Title | Age |
|---|---|---|
| Mr. Geoffrey A. Ballotti | President, CEO & Director | 63 |
| Mr. Paul F. Cash | General Counsel, Chief Compliance Officer & Corporate Secretary | 55 |
| Ms. Monica Melancon | Chief Human Resource Officer | 57 |
| Mr. Scott R. Strickland | Chief Commercial Officer | 54 |
| Mr. Amit Sripathi | Chief Financial Officer | - |
| Mr. Christopher Androski | Senior VP, Controller & Chief Accounting Officer | 51 |
| Mr. Matt Capuzzi | Senior Vice President of Investor Relations | - |
| Mr. Dimitris Manikis | President of Europe, Middle East, Eurasia & Africa | - |
| Mr. Joon Aun Ooi | President of Asia Pacific | - |
| Mr. Shilpan Patel | Executive Vice President of North America Franchise Operations | - |
Audit Risk
5
Board Risk
4
Compensation Risk
7
Shareholder Rights Risk
1
Part 2 · The price and when to enter
This part won't tell you whether the company is worth owning: it helps you choose when to buy it, once the fundamentals have convinced you. Inside: technical analysis, potential, historical drawdowns, gamma exposure.
Latest News
Recent headlines for WH, sourced from Markets Gazette.